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*Matteo Maserati*

### **The Doctrine of Exemplarism in the Franciscan Thought**

📖 J.F. FALÀ / I. ZAVATTERO (eds), *Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIII<sup>th</sup>-XIV<sup>th</sup> Century)*, Aracne, Roma 2018 (Flumen Sapientiae 8)

The volume is the eighth of the series “*Flumen Sapientiae*. Studi sul pensiero medievale”, published by Aracne with the contribution of the University of Trento (Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia). Edited by Jacopo Francesco Falà (IEF - Università de Coimbra) and Irene Zavattero (Università degli Studi di Trento), the script displays a collection of writings devoted to analysing the topic of divine ideas, narrowed to the historical context of Franciscan thinkers throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The number of works within it, amounting to fifteen, corresponds to an overall length of about five hundred pages. Other than an introduction and a conclusive work, it is possible to part the volume in three main sections, namely a first group of papers addressing theories preceding John Duns Scotus’ ones, a second group of works chiefly concerning the *Doctor Subtilis*’ position on the topic and, lastly, a third group dealing with theories developed after Duns Scotus, most of which are inherently in comparison with the latter’s holdings.

Irene Zavattero’s prefatory work – “In Augustine Footsteps. The Doctrine of Ideas in Franciscan Thought” –, offers a general account of each following paper while providing a useful frame for the main topic. In point of fact, it presents the two grounding Augustinian theses for the later medieval exemplarism and stresses how Franciscan authors managed to both systematise and refine the implications of Augustine’s claims in general, thus building a distinctive Platonic tradition. Moreover, the reasons for the topic being circumscribed are explained: despite the fact that such a choice is not entirely original in itself, the inquiry may lead to some interesting historiographic conclusions. According to the standard account for Franciscan medieval exemplarism, for instance, both the founding role and the highest peak of it are usually conferred to Bonaventure of Bagnoregio’s thought, while in this volume earlier accounts are neatly invigorated and the pivotal point for the history of the doctrine itself is identified with John Duns Scotus’ confrontation with Henry of Ghent.

The first three works by Riccardo Saccenti (Università degli Studi di Bergamo), Massimiliano Lenzi (Sapienza Università di Roma) and Stève Bobillier (Sapienza Università di Roma) are respectively devoted to Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, and lastly Peter John Olivi.

In “*Sic bonum cognoscitur similiter lux*.”

Divine Ideas in the First Franciscan Masters”, Saccenti focuses mainly on the linguistic innovations that the two authors provide in their work, by which they contribute to develop the medieval theological terminology, and offer a base for further thinkers to use. After a brief introduction with a reference to Bonaventure’s position, the paper starts tracing back Peter Lombard’s holdings, mainly in two of his writings: the *Collectanea in Epistulas Pauli* and the *Libri Sententiarum*. Divine essence, expressed by the denominations *cognitio Dei* and *praesentia Dei*, coincides with divine knowledge, so that the relationship between God and the creatures is entailed by the notion of *scientia Dei*. Pertaining creatures, a pair of concepts is particularly relevant: *natura*, which expresses creatural beings in their temporal dimension, and *ratio*, which corresponds instead to the principle of beings, namely the atemporal knowledge of God. After a brief exposition of Stephen Langton’s holdings in the *Glossae in Sententiae* about the terms *ydea*, *exemplum* and *exemplar*, Saccenti proceeds to explain and analyse the debate arising from such terms in the works of the two Franciscan Masters. In Alexander of Hales’ *Glossae*, the relationship between God and creatures is expressed by three terms whose distinction is purely nominal: *ratio*, *ydea* and *sapientia*. By meaning the only wisdom of the Creator, the latter term entails unity, while the previous ones express the plural aspect of the relation referred to the models of things. The aforementioned term *exemplar* is then associated with *ratio* and *ydea* and signifies primarily the divine model as the origin of actually existent things. On the other hand, *sapientia* refers to the divine model as conceived in an absolute non-temporal fashion. John de la Rochelle marks then a development in the meaning of *ydea*, stating that it may be intended both as *ymago* and *exemplar*, terms which refer to the same element but in a different time-related way: *ymago* points to the past and marks

the effect, while *exemplar* points to the future and marks the cause. This distinction allows de la Rochelle to overcome a possible *empasse* in Hales’ position, namely the fact that eternal models in God’s mind seemed to refer only to actual beings: their scope is now therefore explicitly extended to both actual or past creatures as well as future non-yet-existing ones.

“La negazione delle idee e l’oscurantismo’ dei filosofi” focuses on the reception of Aristotle as a source for medieval theology, and deals specifically with the account of exemplarism that Bonaventure of Bagnoregio presents. Both in his *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* and commentaries on the *Libri Sententiarum*, the *Seraphicus* ascribes to Plato a theory of divine ideas consistent with the Christian one which, in its canonical form, had been exposed by Augustine of Hippo. While the Aristotelian position entailed that Platonic ideas were separated from the divine mind, Augustine upheld the opposite. Bonaventure follows the latter and even develops a theory of truth according to which truth itself resides in the adequacy between things and the intellect causing them, the divine one. This position is established on the distinction between human ideas, imprinted forms in the human mind, and divine ones, expressive forms which convey the creatural essences far better than the creatures themselves. The relation between the expressive models in God’s mind and their corresponding *res* marks a twofold similitude, namely one univocal and the other analogical, and by the latter, Bonaventure regains the Platonic relation of participation in his own theory. In the conclusive remarks, Lenzi underlines then how by the *Seraphicus’* account of exemplarism arises an image of Aristotle which is rather discordant with the one depicted by Thomas Aquinas. If the *Angelicus* acknowledges the Aristotelian philosophy as the authentic grounding for divine exemplarism in spite of the Platonic view, Bonaventure does in fact the complete opposite.

“Divine Ideas and Beatific Vision by Peter John Olivi” mainly deals with three passages of Olivi’s production: *Summa* I, 6, *De Deo cognoscendo*, q. 2 and *Summa* II, 75, 80. In the first text, the author addresses six different exemplarist positions and offers his own, grounded in the concept of *ratio realis* and in an original way of connecting the divine knowledge with the divine will. In the second writing, then, Olivi deals with the role of divine ideas in human intellection and criticises the Avicennian account of intellectual illumination, thus ending up with considering divine ideas only as representative models for intelligible realities. Moreover, according to the author, these models work together with the human intellect only because of God’s will. The last text addresses the problem of the possibility and behaviour of the beatific vision, given both the limited intellect of the blessed and the infinity of the divine essence. Olivi crosses here the field of ethics and employs the metaphor of the mirror: by looking at God, the blessed also sees himself in the act of watching. This double observation is exploited to establish the freedom of the blessed who, seeing himself as loving the divine, consequently freely adheres to such an act. Concluding his paper, Bobillier marks how his interpretation of Olivi’s account on exemplarism is less radical than Piron’s one, since he shows how the author wishes to follow the tradition while detecting the dangers related to illumination theories. It is also pointed out how Olivi’s notion of *ratio realis* and his conception of the role of will both project this author towards the latter position of John Duns Scotus.

The section devoted to Duns Scotus’ theories consists in three papers: Timothy B. Noone (The Catholic University of America) and Carl A. Vater (St. John Vianney Theological Seminary) focus on the role of Peter John Olivi and Petrus de Trabibus as relevant sources for the *Doctor Subtilis*. Jacopo Francesco Falà explores specifically two questions of Scotus’ *Colla-*

*tiones Oxonienses* and stresses the debate between the author and Henry of Ghent. Lastly, Ernesto Dezza (Pontificia Università Antonianum, Roma) examines how the author exploits the concept of ‘instant of nature’ together with his modal theory in order to explain the production of ideas in God.

“The Sources of Scotus’s Theory of Divine Ideas” displays the transition within exemplarist theories from a conception of divine ideas as real relations of imitability, tools by which God manages to know each creature as an imitation of himself, towards the Scotist account, which asserts instead the rational nature of divine ideas, the rejection of imitability as an essential property of those ideas as well as their dependence on the creatural knowledge. Noone and Vater remark that two lines of inquiry about divine ideas may be followed, namely one concerning their scope and the other concerning their ontology, and state that the paper is concerned only with the second one. Coming to the sources, the authors show three objections to the traditional exemplarist theory pointed out by Olivi and Trabibus. In his *In I Sententiarum*, q. 6, Olivi addresses the imitability theory expressed by Thomas Aquinas and underlines two drawbacks. Firstly, God does not know any creature directly but only by the mediation of ideas. Then, every relation requires its related terms in order to be, and yet divine ideas seem to be prior to their own *relata*. Peter de Trabibus adds in his commentary on the Sentences that ideas have to entail the cognitive, causal and determinative *ratio* of the things they refer to, but divine ideas traditionally conceived fail to do so. Moreover, although imitability is required in order to understand divine ideas, it is not at all essential for their existence and it is pointless as well in differentiating one idea from another. The authors then show how Scotus makes those objections his own and still how his arguments do not overlap completely with Olivi’s and Trabibus’, especially given the

condemnation of the former in 1283. The paper is followed by two appendices presenting the texts of Olivi's *In I Sententiarum*, q. 6, ad 16 (appendix A) and Trabibus' *In I Sententiarum*, d. 35, pars I, art. 2 (appendix B).

"Divine Ideas in the *Collationes Oxonienses*" is divided in four sections: the first and the second one deal with the structure, authenticity and metaphysical content of the *Collationes*, while the third and fourth present each a confrontation between Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus about a specific topic, treated respectively in the eighth and ninth question of the *Collationes*. The exemplarist position endorsed by the *Doctor Solemnis* is well rooted into the traditional account, maintaining that divine ideas amount to a finite number of relations of imitability by which God knows any creature, and yet it inserts a relevant distinction concerning the object of intellection. As a matter of fact, the Author claims that such an object can be considered as informing the act of intellection or rather as terminating it; in the first case, the object bestows a positive cognitive content, whereas the second case needs a further distinction: the object can in fact be the end of a cognitive act either primarily or secondarily. Divine knowledge terminates therefore primarily in the divine essence and secondarily in what differs from it, i.e. creatures. The divine ideas of created beings, relations of imitability or creatural essences as known by God, are then to undergo the ontological distinction between *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae*, being eventually assigned the first one. Duns Scotus' position is hence neatly incompatible with Henry of Ghent's, since the *Subtilis* endorses a conception according to which God knows creatures because he knows his own essence, and that predates any kind of relation. Furthermore, divine ideas are infinite in number, express the creatural quiddities and display a diminished kind of being which the author opposes to the *esse essentiae* of the Flemish

Master. In his conclusions, Falà points out the historiographic importance of the two questions analysed in the paper, which show how influential in the Oxonian environment Henry of Ghent's positions were and how they marked the context in which Scotus' earlier speculation, in some aspects already consistent with its latter gains, was bred.

"Giovanni Duns Scoto e gli *instantia naturae*" sets the thesis for which the instants of nature in Scotus' production are to be considered as a multifunctional hermeneutic tool. Despite the fact that such a tool does not correspond to any fixed or univocal pattern, it nevertheless succeeds in solving different problems by adapting to them specifically. Before its conclusive remarks, the paper is subdivided in three main sections: the first and the second briefly present the idea of contingency endorsed by Scotus, the third leads to the concept of instant of nature passing through those of natural and temporal anteriority, *signum* and *ordo naturae* as well as their formulation in Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet*, criticised by the *Subtilis*. The difference in approach with the *instantia naturae* is mainly shown by comparing *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* I, 35 with *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* I, 43. If in the first passages the author sorts the instants in three distinct moments, in the second ones four moments are instead described. According to Dezza, such a difference is due to the fact that Scotus addresses in each case a different topic, thus marking the ductile and functional nature of the instants themselves.

The last section deals with the posterity of Scotus and displays seven papers. Marina Fedeli (Università degli studi di Macerata) deepens the linkage between divine ideas and the theory of relations according to James of Ascoli; the second work by Davide Riserbato (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano) is intertwined with the first since it focuses on William of Alnwick, who develops his exemplarist theory explicitly arguing with Ascoli's. Chiara

Paladini (Università degli Studi dell'Aquila) presents a long and articulated work explaining the innovative theory of Peter Auriol about exemplar causality, which opposes both Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.

William Duba (Université de Fribourg, Switzerland) tracks a path that, starting from the Scotist Hugh of Novocastro and moving through Landulfo Caracciolo and Francis of Marchia, leads to the innovative and Platonising exemplarist account of Francis of Meyronnes. During its course, the work deals with the figures of James of Ascoli and Peter Auriol as well, and it therefore establishes an interesting dialogue with some of the previous papers. The sway of Augustine and Plato against the Scotist canonical exemplarism is found also in the account of Petrus Thomae, explained by Garrett Smith (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn) in his paper.

Alessandro Ghisalberti (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano) focuses then on William of Ockham's reception and criticism of Duns Scotus' position, influenced by the new logical and metaphysical perspective of the *Venerabilis Inceptor*. Finally, Andrea Nannini (Uniwersytet Warszawski, Poland) presents the position of John of Ripa, an author who grounds in an innovative metaphysics his own account of divine ideas, debating one more time critically with the Scotist theory.

"Le idee divine e la relazione di imitabilità dell'essenza in Giacomo d'Ascoli" focuses on the connection between Ascoli's theory of ideas and theory of relations. A main thesis, upheld explicitly by the *Profundus* in his *Quodlibet* 6-8, intercepts both of the aforementioned topics, namely the distinction *ab aeterno* between God and creatures even before the actual production of the latter. Ascoli generally follows Scotus in the conception of divine ideas, described as *res relativa* not essentially imitative and not determining the divine knowledge of creatures. Being cognised, divine ideas belong to the mental domain

(*entes in anima*) in an objective way, meaning that they differ only accidentally from extra-mental being, since they can correspond to it as forms. Before their creation, creatures already belonged to the divine mind, subsisting *ab aeterno* in an intentional form of being, neither real nor rational. In *Quodlibet* 6, Ascoli develops his own theory of relations mainly in opposition with Henry of Ghent's. Fedeli clearly highlights how the notion of *respectus imitabilitatis*, which for the Flemish Master denotes a mode of the relative *fundamentum*, is indeed received by Ascoli and radically reconverted, by asserting its distinction from the *fundamentum* itself as well as its dependence on it. This is why Ascoli refuses to conceive divine ideas as relations of imitability, since otherwise the *respectus* would be both independent from the foundation and essential to it. As already upheld by Scotus, then, creatures are not produced nor known by God by means of real relations of imitability.

"*Ut induit rationem ideae*. L'essenza divina e l'essere intellegibile: identità (e differenza) secondo Guglielmo di Alnwick" establishes its analysis primarily in the first two questions of Alnwick's *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intellegibili*. The purpose of that writing is to exhibit how the creatural being, inasmuch as it is known by God, is not produced in either subjective or objective *esse*. Riserbato delimits the scope of the paper only to the understanding of the relation between the represented being of creatural ideas in God and the divine essence. On this topic, Alnwick's argument is in opposition to James of Ascoli, who grants an intentional kind of being to divine ideas, namely a sort of neither real nor intellectual form of existence, and denies any real overlapping between the represented being and its form. On the other hand, Alnwick refuses any kind of intermediate being, reconceiving the divine ideas as purely intellectual *entia in anima*, and then asserts the effective coincidence between such a kind being and the form that represents it.

By doing so, the author cuts a straight path towards his account of non-producibility of divine ideas, since these somehow end up being identical with the divine essence as it is. Further distinctions are then introduced in order to exclude a real identification between the object *extra animam* and the divine essence in itself. In conclusion, Riserbato stresses that despite not being entirely constant in his suggested contents, Alnwick's goal is nevertheless clear and clearly stated, and his arguments are patiently depending on Ascoli's ones.

"Exemplar Causality as *similitudo aequivoca* in Peter Auriol" is divided in six parts; in the first three ones, Paladini presents Aquinas' and Scotus' exemplarist positions and Auriol's criticism of both of them: the latter upholds that the divine intellect can indeed have a direct access to reality despite any ideal relation, that a purely logical multiplication of ideas in God is sufficient to entail a real division within his essence, and lastly that the object of divine knowledge can be only the divine essence which terminates it. The fourth section then deals with Auriol's positive claims in *Scriptum*, q. 1, d. 35 about the topic, which is subsumed in a general theory of knowledge. In analogy with the human process of knowing, by which the known object is bestowed upon a new mode of being called 'objective appearance', divine knowledge meant in a 'terminative' way shapes the appearance of the creatures, while if understood in a 'denominative' one it marks the totality of created things as indirectly related to God himself. The question of whether and how God can know individuals is then addressed, and Auriol confirms and explains it by the concepts of *signatio* and *signatibilitas passiva*, again bringing a specific topic back to his own general theory of knowledge. The last section before the conclusion is concerned with exemplar causality, which Auriol explains by regaining some of Averroes' assertions. Specifically, the Author claims that there is not a real similarity between an

*exemplar* and its *exemplatum* and that their relation is in fact equivocal: since each idea is related to several corresponding individual things, then it cannot be univocal to any of them, otherwise it would only succeed in representing a single *ideatum*, leaving all the others excluded. Equivocalness, on the contrary, must be asserted, since it safeguards such a multiplicity of relations. In the conclusive section, Paladini stresses how Auriol strikes a fatal blow to the traditional accounts of exemplarism by unhinging their grounding univocal correspondence between ideal models and things.

"From Scotus to the *Platonici*: Hugh of Novocastro, Landulph Caracciolo, and Francis of Meyronnes" is the longest paper in the volume and is followed by three appendices, each of those presenting the edition of a text. The first section of the work is concerned with John Duns Scotus' exemplarist position and underlines its fragile elements; the second section is then devoted to Hugh of Novocastro's defence of the Scotist exemplarism, specifically the account for which ideas are cognitive objects distinct from the divine essence, against a rival theory consistent with Bonaventure's one. Another later author who supported the *Subtilis*, this time against Peter Auriol, is Landulph Caracciolo, to whom the third section is mainly dedicated. Dissatisfied with Auriol's account of denominative cognitions, Caracciolo presents four arguments to endorse the conceiving of divine ideas as cognised objects and holds as well that they are infinite in number. In doing so, he also exploits the work of Novocastro and provides an epistemological approach to the topic, the modal results of which will be deepened by another Scotist: Francis of Marchia. The last author analysed by Duba is then Francis of Meyronnes, whose innovative position sets a neat distinction between philosophical and theological inquiry about ideas. If the first three Franciscans, lecturing on the *Libri Sententiarum* in Paris between 1310 and 1319, grounded their works in the theory of Sco-

tus, developing it while keeping its main assumptions, Meyronnes, who lectured in 1320-1321, progressively moved away from the Scotist trail introducing Augustinian and Platonic elements, thus creating a new frame. Each appendix presents a section of the commentaries on the Sentences, respectively by Novocastro (d. 36, qq. 4-6), Caracciolo (dd. 35-36) and Meyronnes (d. 48). About the editors, the first text is by Duba and Roberta Padlina (Université de Fribourg), the second one by Duba and Christopher Schabel (University of Cyprus), the last one by Duba only.

“Petrus Thomae on Divine Ideas and Intelligible Being” analyses the position assumed by Petrus Thomae in his *Reportatio*, dd. 35-36, a *compilatio* on Scotus’ revised commentaries on the *Libri Sententiarum*, and *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*. In defining the concept of ‘idea’, Thomae tries to harmonise the different accounts of Augustine and Scotus, holding that divine ideas are eternal and uncreated principles which display a practical rather than speculative role, and at the same time accepting that the object of the divine knowledge consists in the creatural quiddities. Intelligible and yet uncreated by any intellect, those quiddities belong directly to the divine essence in a special mode, thanks to which they constitute a Platonising mirror-set of the existent beings. To express such a condition, Thomae resorts to the concept of ‘intelligible containment’, the antecedents of which Smith indicates in the accounts of James of Ascoli, William of Alnwick and Hugh of Novocastro. About the reality of the creatural being, Thomae argues that it is granted *ab aeterno* and supports this claim introducing the interesting conception of ‘formal sameness’, derived from the Scotist ‘formal distinction’. The last section of the paper deals with the role that divine ideas display in the process of creation, in which Thomae has to prove how his conception of a plurality of real eternal beings does not clash with the Christian account of creation it-

self. In order to do so, the Author presents three different kinds of arguments, respectively by reason (developing an interesting conception of ‘nothingness’), by example (through the metaphor of mirror and reflection) and lastly by authority. The result is that, even if the premises might have led to a strong Platonic position, namely that God would have connected the eternal divine models with an external material principle, Petrus Thomae eventually maintains a much more standard account for his time: divine ideas are not full-fledged Platonic forms, but cognised creatures at last.

“Le idee divine in Guglielmo di Ockham” can be linked with the previous article by Dezza, since the first part of the paper is devoted to the criticism Ockham presented about Duns Scotus’ instants of nature. The *Venerabilis Inceptor* argues that relations in God can have only an objective kind of being, since ideas correspond to relative nouns and therefore miss a *quid rei*. Corresponding also with singular real individuals, divine ideas as well are to be conceived as singular and distinct elements; indeed, they are identified with individual creatures inasmuch as they are known by the divine intellect. The relationship between God and the beings in the process of creation is thus direct, since there is no distinction between the divine essence and the ideas of creatural things: instead of creating by appealing to archetypal models, God chooses to produce the singular real creatures that he already knows are producible. Such account, grounded on a nominalist metaphysics, sets an overcoming of the standard exemplarist conception. Other relevant features of Ockham’s metaphysics are actually involved with the topic of divine ideas and therefore addressed, for instance the distinction between *potentia Dei absoluta* and *potentia Dei ordinata* as well as the problem of future contingents and predestination. In the conclusive remarks, Ghisalberti stresses how Ockham’s account radicalises the typical Franciscan topics of

the absolute divine freedom and the value of individuals, even if by doing so the human inquiry must stop at the barrier of the absolute divine power.

*“Immensa exemplaritas.* La dottrina delle idee nella metafisica di Giovanni da Ripa” displays the metaphysical issues underlying John of Ripa’s exemplarist account and then shows how this innovative solution opposes to Scotus’ one while regaining some Augustinian aspects. In his *Lectura*, d. 2, the author develops a strong metaphysical vision of the divine creative activity, hinging on the concept of *replicatio*. Specifically, Ripa claims that the absolute perfect unity, which is God, freely replicates itself, thus gifting the produced being in the process with a commensurate amount of perfections. The outcome of such an iterated replication is the creation of a well-ordered world according to a couple of main transcendent coordinates: one that leads from the non-being to its infinite form, the other that ascends from the inanimate being to the intelligent one. By intersecting the different rates on the two axes, it is possible to individuate each species coherently with its proper perfections, and every element within each species, namely every individual, has to be considered as a replication of God’s unity as well. Each creatural idea is therefore an idea of such a replication, hence referring to some divine perfections and becoming a twofold element: each idea corresponds in fact both to a divine perfection, immense and ‘super-simple’, and to an infinite exemplar for the produced species and creatures. This distinction entails a general reimagining of the relation of eminence between *idea* and *ideatum*, since now each idea has two split aspects: the perfection of being alive, for instance, is expressed in God by an exceeding ‘super-aliveness’, while as the *exemplar* for the living creature it is only ‘infinite aliveness’. This means that creatures are not directly related to the immense divine essence, but instead they are exceeded by the second mode of ideas as immense exemplars. Nannini points out that a much

relevant source for Ripa’s account is Acardo of Saint-Victor, even though mistaken and quoted by Ripa himself as Anselm of Canterbury. Lastly, the major opposition with Scotus consists in two main points: divine ideas as intellectual products and their diminished kind of being, both of which Ripa refutes also endorsing some lexical choices, such as *ydea*, that recall explicitly the thought of Augustine of Hippo.

The conclusive remarks of the volume are entrusted to Alessandro D. Conti (Università degli Studi dell’Aquila), in his “Conclusion. Late Medieval Exemplarism: a Philosophical Assessment”. This work addresses at once the position of Augustine about divine exemplarism, the theoretical aim of which is to explain the intelligibility of the world, and underlines four philosophical issues arising from it (an explanation of the creative process, divine omniscience and providence relatively to free individuals, the linkage between God’s absolute simplicity and the plurality of ideas, the connection divine ideas and universals display, and the question about what kind of things can be ideated). Conti then underlines how two key concepts for the exemplarist theories to develop are those of ‘identity’ and ‘distinction’, since they unfold the relation between one idea and another, as well as between divine ideas and the divine essence. Three sections then follow, each mainly devoted to one author; the first is about Thomas Aquinas, identified as the cornerstone for the development and the articulation of medieval exemplarism. The second one deals with John Duns Scotus and the third with William of Ockham, whose theory radically cuts the connection with the former accounts by conceiving divine ideas as the very creatures under divine intellection. The last remarks stress then the need for most of these authors to reconcile the Aristotelian philosophical approach, related to an impersonal first principle, with the Christian conception of God as a personal being, and the role played by imitability as a tool to



reach such achievement. Eventually, Conti points out that the different approaches displayed by the authors between the thirteenth and the fourteenth century to address the topic add up to three and can be exploited to classify those same authors: a first group tries to defend the Augustinian contents even if contrasting with some known philosophical issues, and this would be the case of Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Alexander of Hales, John de la Rochelle, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio and Peter John Olivi. A second group, instead, constraints those Augustinian contents within the boundaries of a general philosophical theory (James of Ascoli, Peter Auriol, Petrus Thomae); lastly, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham would be the ones to assign a priority to the Holy Scriptures, thus adapting to them the conceptual tools and the theories they both managed to develop.

It has to be noted at last that the volume is very dense and truly well structured: each of the works it displays, other than being rich and rigorous in its own contents, can be fruitfully compared with at least some of the others, either directly or indirectly. Such an interlacement builds a comprehensive frame for the 'Franciscan tradition' about the topic of exemplarism and divine ideas, a frame which is theoretical as well as historiographic, and fulfils effectively what Irene Zavattero wished in the prefatory section.

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*Marialucrezia Leone*

***Per studium et doctrinam.***  
**Honoring the Outstanding**  
**Achievements of Loris Sturlese**

📖 A. BECCARISI / A. PALAZZO (a cura di), *Per Studium et Doctrinam. Fonti e testi di filosofia medievale dal XII al XIV secolo*, Aracne, Roma 2018 (Flumen Sapientiae, 6)

The present volume, edited by Alessandra Beccarisi and Alessandro Palazzo, is a miscellany in honour of Prof. Loris Sturlese

(since 2012, President of the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale – SIEPM – and since 2016 member of the Accademia dei Lincei). This is actually the second *Festschrift* dedicated to Sturlese<sup>1</sup>. While the first one was published at the occasion of his 60<sup>th</sup> birthday, the present anthology contains articles by several students, who have written their master theses and doctoral dissertations under the supervision of the great scholar.

The eleven contributions reflect the interests that have preeminently characterized Sturlese's long and successful scientific career. They are dedicated to his sponsorship encouragement and inspiration of innovative research in Medieval Philosophy, always based on critical edition of the texts, careful analysis of the sources, the manuscripts and the authors, with special attention to their historical and philosophical background. Among the numerous fields of investigation, Loris Sturlese's research gained reputation of being attentive to an "alternative culture", as Sturlese himself puts it, that is represented especially by medieval German thought discussed in Latin and in vulgar in the XII-XV centuries. The pivot of this area of investigation primarily lies in a "Teutonic perspective" and no longer in a "Parisian perspective" alone, and was established by the doctrine of Albertus Magnus and the Dominican *Studium*, founded in Cologne in 1248. Besides that, the shift in perspective was supported by the re-evaluation of the thought and works of Albert's followers, primarily Ulrich of Strasburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Berthold of Moosburg, Henry of Lübeck and Meister Eckhart. This has resulted in a rich and fruitful research, paving the way for a myriad of projects over the years that fall under his curatorship.

<sup>1</sup> A. BECCARISI / R. IMBACH / P. PORRO (Hrsg.), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2008.