Foreign Market Entry Strategies under Asymmetric Information
5,00 €
A home firm signals her private cost information by expanding in a foreign firm’s country. Credible signalling to deter counter-entry may occur through a direct investment (but not through exports) and may even entail entering an unprofitable market. While this produces social benefits, uninformative signalling may be welfare-reducing. Hence, we argue that moderate to high location costs may be sociallydesirable. We also show that there are not simple monotonic relationships between technology/demand conditions and firms’ entry modes. Thus, the signalling explanation of international expansionmakes it possible to motivate some controversial empirical findings on a theoretical ground
pagine: 40
formato: 17 x 24
ISBN: 978-88-7999-909-0
data pubblicazione: Gennaio 2006
editore: Aracne
collana: Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica “Antonio Ruberti” della “Sapienza” Università di Roma | 2004/19
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