One-Way Access Pricing, Imperfect Competition and Network Investments
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A facility-based firm invests in network quality and sells local access to her downstream subsidiary and an independent firm, which provide vertically differentiated value-added services. We show that access price regulation is welfare-enhancing, since it fosters competition while preserving investment incentives. This result is robust to four model specifications: i) the regulator credibly commits before the investment stage; ii) there exist consumer switching costs; iii) the rival firm considers (partial) backward integration; iv) theaccess owner is vertically separated. Thus, we reverse negative literature findings and dilute policy concerns about the effects of behavioural and structural regulation on long-run welfare.
pagine: 44
formato: 17 x 24
ISBN: 978-88-548-0285-8
data pubblicazione: Novembre 2005
editore: Aracne
collana: Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica “Antonio Ruberti” della “Sapienza” Università di Roma | 2005/4
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